

# Stochastic Dynamic Graphon Games

## The Linear-Quadratic Case

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Introduction to Mean Field Games and Applications  
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*“Stochastic Graphon Games: II. The Linear-Quadratic Case”* A., Carmona, Laurière, arXiv 2021.

- The graphon game: A limit model for a class of linear-quadratic stochastic games with non-identical players
- Convergence analysis

*“Finite State Graphon Games with Applications to Epidemics”* A., Carmona, Dayanıklı, Laurière, arXiv 2021.

# Introductory example

## Introductory example: MFG for systemic risk

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$N$ -player game with weak interaction (Carmona, Fouque, Sun '13)

$$\min_{\alpha^k} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^k)^2 - q \alpha_t^k \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^k) + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^k) \right)^2 dt + g(X_T^k) \right]$$
$$dX_t^k = a \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^k) + \alpha_t^k \right) dt + \sigma dW_t^k, \quad k = 1, \dots, N$$

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The interaction term is the average log-monetary reserve difference:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^i).$$

"... representing the rate at which bank  $i$  borrows from or lends to bank  $j$ ."

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**What if there is a distinguishing feature, impacting the interaction, such as ... ?**

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A very simple geography:

- each bank is **geographically labeled**, bank  $k$  by  $x_k \in I := [0, 1]$
- **weights**  $w : I \times I \mapsto [0, 1]$ , symmetric
  - $x_k$  and  $x_j$  geographical close  $\Rightarrow w(x_k, x_j)$  is large
  - $x_k$  and  $x_j$  distant  $\Rightarrow w(x_k, x_j)$  is small



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Instead of  $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^k)$ , player  $k$  now "feels" **the weighted aggregate**

$$Z_t^{k,N} := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N w(x_k, x_j) (X_t^j - X_t^k)$$

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$N$ -player game for systemic risk with **non-identical players**

$$\min_{\alpha^k} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^k)^2 - q \alpha_t^k Z_t^{k,N} + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (Z_t^{k,N})^2 dt + g(X_T^k) \right]$$
$$dX_t^k = a (Z_t^{k,N} + \alpha_t^k) dt + \sigma dW_t^k$$

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### Limit model with infinitesimal agents

Drawing inspiration from economic theory:

- If the agent (index) space is an **atomless probability space**  $(I, \mathcal{I}, \lambda)$  then each individual agent has no influence.
- Aggregates are averages over the **agent space** (cf. expectations)
- Agents are exposed to **idiosyncratic shocks** (independent noise)

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### A candidate continuum limit model

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\alpha^x} \mathbb{E} & \left[ \int_0^T \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_t^x)^2 - q \alpha_t^x Z_t^x + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} (Z_t^x)^2 dt + g(X_T^x) \right] \\ dX_t^x &= a(Z_t^x + \alpha_t^x) dt + \sigma dW_t^x, \quad t \in [0, T], x \in I \\ Z_t^x &= \int_I w(x, y) (X_t^y - X_t^x) dy, \quad t \in [0, T], x \in I \end{aligned}$$

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(Q1) Is the (linear-quadratic) limit model well defined?

(Q2) Can we compute and approximate Nash equilibria?

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The candidate limit model is building on the Brownian motion vector  $(B^x)_{x \in I}$ .

Measurability problems when  $\lambda$  is the Lebesgue measure

- For an iid Brownian motion  $(B^x)_{x \in I}$  based on the usual continuum product via Kolmogorov construction: **almost all sample functions  $x \mapsto B^x(\omega)$  are essentially equal to an arbitrarily given function  $x \mapsto \beta^x$  on  $[0, 1]$ .**
- A process like that is not measurable in the index – problem defining aggregates!

Relating back to the motivating example:

- Interaction term is the aggregate  $\int_I w(x, y)(X_t^y - X_t^x) dy$
- $y \mapsto X_t^y$  is *a priori not dy-measurable!*

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- The graphon game: A limit model for linear-quadratic stochastic games with non-identical players
  - Measurability problems addressed with Fubini extension theory
  - (Linear) Graphon SDE
  - Nash equilibria for LQ Graphon games
- Convergence analysis

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- Finite state graphon games
  - Pure-jump Graphon SDE
  - Applications to epidemiology

# The Linear Graphon SDE System



## The Linear Graphon SDE system

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We will consider the following "linear SDE" system: given an admissible strategy profile  $\underline{\alpha} \in \underline{\mathcal{A}}$  (open-loop; decentralized; progressive; square integrable)

$$\begin{cases} dX_t^x = \left( a(x)X_t^x + b(x)\alpha_t^x + c(x)Z_t^x \right) dt + dB_t^x, & t \in [0, T], x \in I \\ Z_t^x = \int_I w(x, y) X_t^y \lambda(dy), & t \in [0, T], x \in I, \\ X_0^x = \xi^x \end{cases}$$

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### The graphon $w$

- is a symmetric measurable function from  $I \times I$  to  $[0, 1]$
- induces a Hilbert-Schmidt operator  $W : L^2(I) \rightarrow L^2(I)$
- $W$  can be extended to  $L^2_\lambda(I)$  (and beyond)

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**(Q1) Is the (linear-quadratic) limit model well defined?**

Is there a suitable probability space over  $\Omega \times I$  where we can

- define the idiosyncratic noise  $(B^x)_{x \in I}$  so that
- the aggregates  $(Z_t^x)_{x \in I}$  are well-defined and
- in which we can solve the system (1) in a strong sense?

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Fubini extension

Theory developed by (Sun '98, '06; Sun, Zhang '09) and others.

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Guarantees the existence of a probability space  $(\Omega \times I, \mathcal{W}, \mathbb{Q})$

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→ where the agent space  $(I, \mathcal{I}, \lambda)$

1. is atomless
2. extends the Lebesgue space  $(I, \mathcal{B}(I), \text{Leb}(I))$

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→ carrying an **essentially pairwise independent** Brownian motion vector  $(B^x)_{x \in I}$

for  $\lambda$ -a.e.  $x \in I$   $B^x$  is independent of  $B^y$  for  $\lambda$ -a.e.  $y \in I$



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To emphasize the Fubini property ( $\mathbb{Q}$  disintegrates with marginals  $\mathbb{P}$  and  $\lambda$ ) we write

$$(\Omega \times I, \mathcal{F} \boxtimes \mathcal{I}, \mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda) := (\Omega \times I, \mathcal{W}, \mathbb{Q})$$

We will denote  $L^2$ -spaces over the Fubini extension by  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$ , expectation by  $\mathbb{E}^{\boxtimes}$ .

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Let  $f$  be a process from  $(\Omega \times I, \mathcal{F} \boxtimes \mathcal{I}, \mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda)$  to the Polish space  $S$ . If  $(f^x)_{x \in I}$  are e.p.i., then  $\lambda \circ [f \cdot (\omega)]^{-1} = (\mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda) \circ [f \cdot (\cdot)]^{-1}$ ,  $\mathbb{P}$ -a.s.

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Corollary: if  $f$  is furthermore  $\mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda$ -integrable:

$$\int_A f^x(\omega) \lambda(dx) = \int_A \mathbb{E}[f^x] \lambda(dx), \quad A \in \mathcal{I}, \mathbb{P}\text{-a.s.}$$

*"Complete removal of individual uncertainty", "Insurable risk"*

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### Example

Since  $(B_t^x)_{x \in I}$  are e.p.i. and integrable

$$\int_A B_t^x(\omega) \lambda(dx) = \int_A \mathbb{E}[B_t^x] \lambda(dx) = 0, \quad \mathbb{P}\text{-a.s.}, \quad A \in \mathcal{I}, \quad t \in [0, T].$$

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With  $(B^x)_{x \in I}$  and  $\lambda$  as introduced in the discussion above

$$\begin{cases} dX_t^x = (a(x)X_t^x + b(x)\alpha_t^x + c(x)Z_t^x)dt + dB_t^x, & t \in [0, T], x \in I \\ Z_t^x = \int_I w(x, y)X_t^y \lambda(dy), & t \in [0, T], x \in I, \\ X_0^x = \xi^x \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

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### Theorem (A., Carmona, Laurière)

Let  $a, b, c : I \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be  $\mathcal{I}$ -measurable and bounded. For each admissible strategy profile  $\alpha$  (open-loop, decentralized, progressive, square-integrable):

→ There exists a unique solution  $X$  to (1) (in  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$ -sense)

→ The aggregate  $Z$  is almost surely deterministic:

$$\mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda (\|Z - f\|_T = 0) = 1, \quad f(\omega, x) := \tilde{f}(x), \quad \tilde{f} \in L^2_{\lambda}(I; \mathcal{C}) \quad (\omega, x) \in \Omega \times I.$$

→ There is a version of  $X$  that solves (1) for all  $x \in I$  (in  $L^2$ -sense) and of  $Z$  that is deterministic for all  $x \in I$ .

Take-aways from the theorem:

- We can replace  $Z_t^x$  with the **deterministic aggregate**  $\int_I w(x, y) \mathbb{E}[X_t^y] \lambda(dy)$
- or  $\int_I w(x, y) \mathbb{E}[X_t^y] dy$  if  $y \mapsto \mathbb{E}[X_t^y]$  is  $\mathcal{B}(I)$ -measurable (depends on assumptions on  $\xi, a, b, c$ )

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- We can solve the Graphon SDE "**x-by-x**" (compared to an  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$  sense)



# The Stochastic Graphon Game

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$$J^x(\beta; \underline{\alpha}) := \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f^x(X_t^x, \beta_t, Z_t^x) dt + h^x(X_T^x, Z_T^x) \right],$$

$$dX_t^x = \left( a(x)X_t^x + b(x)\beta_t + c(x)Z_t^x \right) dt + dB_t^x, \quad X_0^x = \xi^x,$$

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- Strategy profile  $\underline{\alpha}$  appears *only in the aggregate*
- Aggregate insensitive to changing one strategy ( $\lambda$  atomless)
- We write  $J^x(\beta; \underline{\alpha})$  as  $\mathcal{J}^x(\beta; Z^x)$

### Definition (Nash equilibrium)

An admissible strategy profile  $\hat{\alpha}$  is a **graphon game Nash equilibrium** if

$$\mathcal{J}^x(\hat{\alpha}^x; Z^{\hat{\alpha};x}) \leq \mathcal{J}^x(\beta; Z^{\hat{\alpha};x}), \quad \beta \in \mathcal{A}(x), \quad x \in I$$

where  $\mathcal{A}(x)$  is the set of decentralized, open-loop, progressive, square-integrable processes.

# The Stochastic Graphon Game

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## Pontryagin Stochastic Maximum Principle

If  $\hat{\alpha}$  is a **graphon game Nash equilibrium** then

$$\hat{\alpha}_t^x \in \arg \inf_{u \in \mathbb{R}} H^x(t, \hat{X}_t^x, u, p_t^x), \quad \text{a.e. } t \in [0, T], \mathbb{P}\text{-a.s.},$$

for each  $x \in I$ , with  $(\hat{X}^x, p^x, q^x)$  solving the **Hamiltonian system**

$$\begin{cases} d\hat{X}_t^x = \partial_p H^x(t, \hat{X}_t^x, \hat{\alpha}_t^x, p_t^x) dt + dB_t^x, & \hat{X}_0^x = \xi^x, \\ dp_t^x = -\partial_\chi H^x(t, \hat{X}_t^x, \hat{\alpha}_t^x, p_t^x) dt + q_t^x dB_t^x, & p_T^x = \partial_\chi h^x(\hat{X}_T^x, \hat{Z}_T^x), \end{cases}$$

where  $H^x : [0, T] \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is the **Hamiltonian** of player  $x$ ,

$$H^x(t, \chi, u, p) = f^x(\chi, u, \hat{Z}_t^x) + (a(x)\chi + b(x)u + c(x)\hat{Z}_t^x)p,$$

and  $\hat{Z}_t^x$  is the aggregate of  $\hat{X}_t^y$ :  $\hat{Z}_t^x = \int_I w(x, y) \mathbb{E}[\hat{X}_t^y] \lambda(dy)$ .

**Sufficient condition when:**  $(\chi, u) \mapsto (f^x(\chi, u, z), h^x(\chi, z))$  is jointly convex for  $z \in \mathbb{R}$ .

## The Stochastic Graphon Game

---

Linear-quadratic type assumptions:

- $f, h$  quadratic functions
- $a, b, c, f, h$  such that some Riccati equations are solvable

Then the Hamiltonian system (FBSDE) from the Pontryagin SMP

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} d\hat{X}_t^x = \partial_p H^x(t, \hat{X}_t^x, \hat{\alpha}_t^x, p_t^x) dt + dB_t^x, \quad \hat{X}_0^x = \xi^x, \\ dp_t^x = -\partial_x H^x(t, \hat{X}_t^x, \hat{\alpha}_t^x, p_t^x) dt + q_t^x dB_t^x, \quad p_T^x = \partial_x h^x(\hat{X}_T^x, \hat{Z}_T^x), \\ H^x(t, x, u, p) = f^x(x, u, \hat{Z}_t^x) + (a(x)x + b(x)u + c(x)\hat{Z}_t^x)p, \\ \hat{Z}_t^x = \int_I w(x, y) \mathbb{E}[\hat{X}_t^y] \lambda(dy) \end{array} \right.$$

has a **unique solution for arbitrary  $T$  and all  $x \in I$  (in  $L^2$ -sense)**.

Proof idea:

1. Uniqueness in  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$ -sense by comparing two solutions
2. Existence in  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$ -sense for small  $T$  by contraction argument
3. Extend 2. to arbitrary  $T$  with the induction method for FBSDEs (Delarue '02)
4. Extract version solving the system for all  $x \in I$

# A Solvable Example



## Example

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$$\mathcal{J}^x(\alpha^x; Z^x) = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^{T=3} ((\alpha_t^x)^2 + (X_t^x - Z_t^x)^2) dt + (X_T^x - Z_T^x)^2 \right]$$

$$dX_t^x = (-X_t^x + \alpha_t^x + Z_t^x) dt + dB_t^x, \quad X_0^x = \xi^x \sim \text{Normal}(8, 1/4),$$

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$f, h$  convex  $\Rightarrow$  sufficient Pontryagin SMP, equilibrium characterized by the FBSDE

$$d\hat{X}_t^x = \left( -\hat{X}_t^x - p_t^x + \hat{Z}_t^x \right) dt + dB_t^x, \quad \hat{X}_0^x = \xi^x$$

$$dp_t^x = \left( \hat{X}_t^x + p_t^x - \hat{Z}_t^x \right) dt + q_t^x dB_t^x, \quad p_T^x = \hat{X}_T^x - \hat{Z}_T^x$$

$$\hat{Z}_t^x = \int_I w(x, y) \mathbb{E}[\hat{X}_t^y] \lambda(dy), \quad x \in I, \quad t \in [0, T]$$

$\rightarrow$  Solve the FBSDE explicitly up to a system of ODEs (some of them Riccati)

$\rightarrow$  Size of ODE system determined by the rank of the graphon

## Example

---

To solve the FBSDE, make the ansatz  $p_t^x = \eta_t^x + \zeta_t^x \hat{X}_t^x$  where

→  $\eta^x$  and  $\zeta^x$  are deterministic functions of time for all  $x \in I$

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$$\begin{cases} \frac{d\eta_t^x}{dt} = (\eta_t^x)^2 + \eta_t^x + 1, & \eta_T^x = 1 \\ \frac{d\zeta_t^x}{dt} = (1 + \eta_t^x)\zeta_t^x - (1 + \eta_t^x)\hat{Z}_t^x, & \zeta_T^x = -\hat{Z}_T^x, \\ d\hat{X}_t^x = \left( -(1 + \eta_t^x)\hat{X}_t^x - \zeta_t^x + \hat{Z}_t^x \right) dt + dB_t^x, & \hat{X}_0^x = \xi^x \end{cases}$$

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→  $\eta^x$  independent of  $x$  (we drop the superscript)

→ Given  $\eta, (\zeta, \hat{Z})$  forms a closed (infinite-dimensional) system

$$\begin{cases} \frac{d\zeta_t^x}{dt} = (1 + \eta_t)\zeta_t^x - (1 + \eta_t)\hat{Z}_t^x, & \zeta_T^x = -\hat{Z}_T^x, \\ \frac{d\hat{Z}_t^x}{dt} = -(1 + \eta_t)\hat{Z}_t^x - [W\zeta_t^x]^x + [W\hat{Z}_t^x]^x, & \hat{Z}_0^x = [W\xi^x]^x \end{cases}$$

## Example

---

The graphon operator is Hilbert-Schmidt

$$\rightarrow [W\zeta_t]^x = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \lambda_k \phi_k(x) \langle \zeta, \phi_k \rangle_{\lambda_I}$$

$\rightarrow \{\phi_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$  is an orthonormal basis in  $L^2(I)$  of eigenfunctions of  $W$

$\rightarrow \{\lambda_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$  are the corresponding eigenvalues



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- $\{\phi_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$  is an orthonormal basis in  $L^2(I)$  of eigenfunctions of  $W$
- $\{\lambda_k\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$  are the corresponding eigenvalues

Let  $v_t^k := \langle \zeta_t, \phi_k \rangle_{\lambda_I}$ ,  $z_t^k := \langle \hat{Z}_t, \phi_k \rangle_{\lambda_I}$ , and  $x^k := \langle \xi, \phi_k \rangle_{\lambda_I}$ . Then

$$[W\hat{Z}_t](x) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \lambda_k z_t^k \phi_k(x), \quad [W\zeta_t](x) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \lambda_k v_t^k \phi_k(x).$$

where for  $k = 1, 2, \dots$

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dv_t^k}{dt} = (1 + \eta_t)v_t^k - (1 + \eta_t)z_t^k, & v_T^k = -z_T^k, \\ \frac{dz_t^k}{dt} = (-1 - \eta_t + \lambda_k)z_t^k + -\lambda_k v_t^k, & z_0^k = \lambda_k x^k. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$
$$x^k = [W\xi]^x \stackrel{ELLN}{=} [W\mathbb{E}[\xi]]^x = 8$$

- Size of FBODE system (2) is determined by the rank of  $W$ !
- FBODE system (2) can be solved explicitly with the ansatz  $v_t^k = \pi_t^k z_t^k$




## Example

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Graphon	Form	Rank	Eigenvalue(s)	Eigenvector(s)
Constant	$K$	1	$K$	1
Power law	$(xy)^\gamma, \gamma \geq 0$	1	$(1 - 2\gamma)^{-1}$	$(1 - 2\gamma)^{-1/2} x^{-\gamma}$
Min-max	$(x \wedge y)(1 - x \vee y)$	$\infty$	$(\pi k)^{-2}, k \in \mathbb{N}$	$\sqrt{2} \sin(\pi kx), k \in \mathbb{N}$

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Connection with  $N$ -player games

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Two ways to construct finite graphs from graphons

- Sampling open/closed edges
- Weighing edges

We focus on connecting the **latter approach** to the graphon game.

## Connection with $N$ -player games

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Two ways to construct finite graphs from graphons

- Sampling open/closed edges
- Weighing edges

We focus on connecting the **latter approach** to the graphon game.

- $I^\infty$  denote the countable product of  $I$ . A generic sequence  $(x_k)_{k=1}^\infty$  in  $I^\infty$  will be denoted by  $x^\infty$ .
- $\mathcal{I}^\infty$  the countable product of  $\mathcal{I}$
- $\lambda^\infty$  the countable product of  $\lambda$

In **the iteratively completed infinite product space**  $(I^\infty, \bar{\mathcal{I}}^\infty, \bar{\lambda}^\infty)$  the processes  $(B^x)_{x \in x^\infty}$  are mutually independent for  $\bar{\lambda}^\infty$ -a.e.  $x^\infty \in I^\infty$  (Hammond, Sun '21).

→ Let  $(x_k)_{k=1}^\infty = x^\infty \in I^\infty$  be given

→ Consider the  $N$ -player game

$$J^{k,N}(\alpha^{k,N}; \alpha^{-k,N}) := \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T f^{x_k}(X_t^{k,N}, \alpha_t^{k,N}, Z_t^{k,N}) dt + h^{x_k}(X_T^{k,N}, Z_T^{k,N}) \right]$$
$$dX_t^{k,N} = (a(x_k)X_t^{k,N} + b(x_k)\alpha_t^{k,N} + c(x_k)Z_t^{k,N}) dt + dB_t^{x_k}, \quad X_0^{k,N} = \xi^{x_k},$$
$$Z_t^{k,N} := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\ell=1}^N w(x_k, x_\ell) X_t^{\ell,N}, \quad k = 1, \dots, N, \quad t \in [0, T].$$

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Equilibrium conditions by Pontryagin SMP: a fully coupled FBSDE system for

$$(\hat{X}^{k,N}, p^{k\ell,N}, q^{k\ell m,N})_{k,\ell,m=1}^N$$



### Propagation of Chaos

$$\Delta(x^\infty, N) := \max_{1 \leq k \leq N} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \sup_{t \in [0, T]} (|\hat{X}_t^{k, N} - \hat{X}_t^{x_k}|^2 + |p_t^{k, N} - p_t^{x_k}|^2) \right] + \sup_{t \in [0, T]} \mathbb{E} \left[ |\hat{Z}_t^{k, N} - \hat{Z}_t^{x_k}|^2 \right] \right).$$

### Theorem (A., Carmona, Laurière)

For  $\bar{\lambda}^\infty$ -a.e.  $x^\infty \in I^\infty$ :  $\Delta(x^\infty, N) \xrightarrow{N \rightarrow +\infty} 0$

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### Theorem (A., Carmona, Laurière)

For  $\bar{\lambda}^\infty$ -a.e.  $x^\infty \in I^\infty$ :  $\Delta(x^\infty, N) \xrightarrow{N \rightarrow +\infty} 0$

If furthermore  $I \ni x \mapsto w(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}$  is  $1/2$ -Hölder continuous, uniformly in  $y \in I$ , then for all  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists a  $N_\varepsilon : I^\infty \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  such that

$$\bar{\lambda}^\infty \left( \Delta(x^\infty, N) \leq \frac{(C + \varepsilon)^2 \log \log N}{N}, N \geq N_\varepsilon(x^\infty) \right) = 1,$$

where  $C$  is a finite positive constant depending only on  $T$  and the graphon  $w$ .

→ Similar result under other conditions, we can avoid the continuity assumption

Results on the connection with  $N$ -player games implied by the PoC result:

- The graphon game Nash equilibrium strategy collection  $(\hat{\alpha}^{x_k})_{k=1}^N$  **forms an  $\varepsilon_N$ -Nash equilibrium for the  $N$ -player game** between the players  $(x_1, \dots, x_N)$  when  $N \geq \underline{N}(x^\infty)$ ,  $\bar{\lambda}^\infty$ -a.s. where  $\varepsilon_N = O(N^{-1} \log \log N)$ .
- The  $N$ -player game Nash equilibrium **converges componentwise to the graphon game Nash equilibrium**; the rate of convergence is uniform and at most  $\varepsilon_N$ :

$$\max_{1 \leq k \leq N} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T |\hat{\alpha}_t^{k,N} - \hat{\alpha}_t^{x_k}|^2 dt \right] \leq \varepsilon_N^2, \quad N \geq \underline{N}, \quad \bar{\lambda}^\infty\text{-a.e. } x^\infty \in I^\infty.$$

# Finite State Stochastic Graphon Games

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Consider a game between càdlàg processes with a finite state space  $E = \{1, \dots, M\}$ .

What changes?

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- Graphon **pure-jump SDE system** describes the state trajectories

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- Graphon **pure-jump SDE system** describes the state trajectories
- Aggregates are deterministic **and continuous** by ELLN (for a carefully chosen class of controls).

SIR transition rate matrices

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dots & \beta p_t(I) & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & \gamma \\ 0 & 0 & \dots \end{bmatrix} \text{ vs. } \begin{bmatrix} \dots & \beta \int_I w(x, y) p_t^y(I) dy & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & \gamma \\ 0 & 0 & \dots \end{bmatrix}$$



## Finite State Stochastic Graphon Games

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Consider random processes with a finite state space  $E = \{1, \dots, M\}$ .

What changes?

- Poisson random measures replaces Brownian Motion in the construction
- Pure-jump SDE describes state
- Aggregate is deterministic **and continuous** by ELLN (for a carefully chosen class of controls).

### Controlled SIR transition rate matrices

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dots & \beta\alpha_t \int_A a\rho_t(I, da) & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & \gamma \\ 0 & 0 & \dots \end{bmatrix} \text{ vs. } \begin{bmatrix} \dots & \beta\alpha_t^x \int_I w(x, y) \left( \int_A a\rho_t^y(I, da) \right) dy & 0 \\ 0 & \dots & \gamma \\ 0 & 0 & \dots \end{bmatrix}$$

## Finite State Stochastic Graphon Games

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- Pure-jump SDE representation with Poisson random measures  $(N^x)_{x \in I}$
- Extended mean-field interaction to model epidemic disease spread

What we know

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- Extended mean-field interaction to model epidemic disease spread

### What we know

- The Graphon SDE system is well-defined (for a carefully chosen class of controls)

### Theorem (A., Carmona, Dayanikli, Laurière)

Fix an admissible strategy profile  $\underline{\alpha}$ . If  $\kappa$  and  $K$  are bounded and Lipschitz, then there exists a unique solution  $X$  (in  $L^2_{\boxtimes}$ -sense), càdlàg and  $E$ -valued, to

$$X_t^x = \xi^x + \sum_{k=-n+1}^{n-1} k \int_{\mathbb{R} \times (0, t]} \mathbf{1}_{[0, \kappa_s^x(X_{s-}^x, k, \alpha_s^x, Z_{s-}^x)]}(y) N_k^x(dy \otimes ds),$$
$$Z_t^x = \int_I w(x, y) K(\alpha_t^y, X_{t-}^y) \lambda(dy),$$

the corresponding aggregate  $Z$  is  $\mathbb{P} \boxtimes \lambda$ -a.s. deterministic and continuous, and there is a version solving the system for all  $x \in I$  in standard  $L^2$ -sense.

## Finite State Stochastic Graphon Games

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### What we know

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### What is still to be done

- Probabilistic formulation of the game equilibrium
- Connection to  $N$ -player games

**Thank you!**